G.
C. Education Department of Seventh-day Adventists
CARL ROGERS' VIEW OF
PERSONAL WHOLENESS:
An Evaluation and Critique
from a Christian Perspective
Henry H. Lamberton
Faculty of Religion
Loma Linda University
Prepared for the
International Faith and
Learning Seminar
held at
Union College
June, 1993
132-93 Institute for Christian Teaching
Silver Spring,
MD 20904, USA
This paper will identify and compare two conceptions of meaning that have been especially influential in contemporary culture. These are Christianity and humanistic psychology. The later, which is sometimes referred to as psychology's "third force" (because it followed and repudiated psychoanalysis and behaviorism), rose to prominence after World War II, with Abraham Maslow and Carl Rogers as its most influential leaders.
It is almost trite to say that humanistic psychology has had a major impact on American culture. Jones and Butman, (1991) credit Rogers with having originated what, "has probably been the most widely adapted approach to people-helping that has ever been developed. Applications for the business, educational, familial, group, individual, marital and parental contest abound in the literature" (p. 272). By 1973, fifteen years before his death, Rogers observed that the entire body of his published books and articles had been translated into Japanese and significant potions of it into numerous other languages (Rogers, 1974). A national opinion survey of American counseling and clinical psychologists that was published in 1982 (Smith) ranked Rogers as psychotherapy's most influential figure, even though very few of those polled adhered strictly to his methods. But more lasting than Rogers' approach to therapy have been the beliefs he articulated about the nature and potential of the individual self.
While this perspective has
undergone numerous adaptations, including vulgarizations, most of its basic
presuppositions about human nature and wholeness have not changed and can be
identified (Vitz, 1977). Christianity,
of course, has also undergone many adaptations and vulgarizations, and for this
reason I will try to limit what I say about Christian thinking to points over
which there is wide agreement. I will
primarily confine myself to presentations of one writer within each perspective
and to statements each makes about personal wholeness or psychological or
spiritual maturity. I have chosen Henri
Nouwen as a representative of the Christian perspective and have used Carl
Rogers as a representative for the humanistic perspective. Both of these writers present developed
views of how to achieve personal fulfillment and obtain a more cooperative
society, and they both apply their systems to the alleviation of psychological
problems, such as anxiety and depression, as well as to issues of interpersonal
relationships.
The Christian view reflects
my own commitment and forms the background from which this critique is
developed. However, I will give a
relatively brief synopsis of Nouwen's views and then devote most of this paper
to a discussion of Rogers' thinking.
Nouwen (1981), who has
published some thirty titles in the area of Christian spirituality, summarizes
his understanding of "the spiritual life" in his book titled, Making All Things New: An Invitation to the
Spiritual Life. In this book he
shows how a spiritual reorientation can become a curative for anxiety and
purposelessness. He uses as his
starting point the words of Jesus:
"Do not worry . . . but set your hearts on His kingdom first." With respect to the causes of worry, Nouwen
observes that one of the ways in which we moderns most commonly describe our
lives is to say that we are busy. But
even in our busyness we find that our energies and attention are often less
consumed by our occupations than by our preoccupations. Personal preoccupations, which include
obsessions with, "what ifs," and doubts about whether we can meet the
expectations of others, "fill our external and internal lives to the
brim" (p. 28).
Often, along with the sense
that our lives are "filled," we have the disquieting sense that they
are "unfulfilled." Nouwen
says that some of the most common sentiments beneath this sense of
unfulfillment are boredom, (which comes from a sense of disconnectedness and
from questioning the value of what we do); resentment (which we may experience
when we sense we are being used and manipulated for random and meaningless
ends); and depression. The latter is
what we experience when we begin to feel that, "our presence makes little
difference [and] that our absence may be preferred" (p. 31). Frequently, the dynamic of depression is the
end result of lives that are filled, but fragmented and disconnected.
It is against this background that Nouwen applies Jesus' words about worry. He notes that.
"Jesus does not respond to our worry-filled way of living by saying that we should not be so busy with worldly affairs . . . [or by] telling us that what we do is unimportant, valueless, or useless . . . He asks us to shift the point of gravity, to relocated the center of our attention . . . to move from the 'many things' to the 'one necessary thing.'"
For Nouwen, the most
striking feature of Jesus' own life was the unwavering nature of His
focus. This focus consisted of what
Nouwen calls, "single minded obedience of His Father," (Nouwen
contrasts the negative connotations of "obedience" in our society
with Jesus' intimate and trusting relationship with God) which He maintained in
the midst of the unpredictable and changing needs around Him. When Jesus said, "set your hearts on
His kingdom first," He meant, says Nouwen, that we were to, "make the
life of the Spirit within and among us the center of all we think, say or
do." This requires a
self-transformation, something which may be experienced as either sudden or
gradual.
Such a transformation does
not remove the difficulties of life, but it places them in a context that is
purposeful, meaningful and unifying.
This transformation is an act of grace but this does not mean it happens
automatically. Nouwen identifies two
primary methodologies, which he calls "disciplines," which place us
in a position that facilitates the changes God makes in us. (While it is not my intention to endorse all
of the methods Nouwen suggests for practicing these disciplines, I do agree
with the importance of the two disciplines he identifies.) The first is "solitude," by which
he means regular times set aside for prayer, meditation and the contemplation
of scripture. He describes solitude as,
"the simple, though not easy, way to free us from the slavery of our occupations
and preoccupations and to begin to hear the voice that makes all things
new" (p. 75).
The second means of setting
our hearts on the kingdom is through what Nouwen calls the discipline of
community. It is related to the first
discipline because God speaks to us through others as well as in solitude. Community, as Nouwen defines it, "has
little to with mutual compatibility" and it stands in contrast to the many
groups, "that have formed to protect their own interests, to defend their
own status, or to promote their own causes." He states that, "through the discipline of community we
prevent ourselves from clinging to each other in fear and loneliness, and
[become able] to listen to the liberating voice of God" (pp. 81-83). An element of discipline is required to
maintain relationships with persons towards whom we feel little natural
attraction.
In summary, Nouwen sees both
individual and social wholeness as achieved by a regeneration that comes
through a spiritual connection with God.
Rogers and Nouwen agree that
wholeness involves moving away from a slavish concern with the expectations and
evaluations of others and a corresponding reorientation to a single source of
meaning and authority.
For Rogers, however, this
source of meaning is not discovered by knowing God, but through recovering
contact with ones' real and authentic self.
Rogers (1951) linked his theory of human fulfillment with the methods of
science whenever he could. The
following quotation illustrates this link as well as his explicit rejection of
the need for any external source of meaning or authority:
Civilization hitherto has looked for the orientation of society through an imposed 'system' derived from some extrinsic authority, such as religion, 'cultural' education, or political suasion. The biologist conceives an order emanating from the organism living in poises in its environment. Our necessity, therefore is to secure the free flow of forces in the environment so that the order inherent in the material we are studying may emerge (p. 62).
Although Rogers went
considerably beyond biological methods as a basis for his conclusions about
human nature, he did place a great emphasis on what he saw as the flow of
forces within the individual. These
forces were part of the "self experience" which became for him the
ultimate source of truth and meaning.
It is to experience that I must return again and again; to discover a closer approximation to truth as it is in the process of becoming in me. Neither the Bible nor the prophets--neither Freud nor research--neither the revelations of God nor man--can take precedence over my own direct experience (1961, pp. 23-24).
These statements illustrate
a key difference between the sources of authority and meaning for the two
perspectives being considered, but they also reveal that Rogers did not claim
ultimate allegiance to empirical research as a basis for understanding
persons. Both of these points will be
commented on further but it will be useful to first summarize what Rogers meant
by personal experience and how this meaning related to his theory of
personality and mental health.
Jones and Butman (1991) have
suggested that the "Core assertion of [Rogers'] personality theory is that
there is but one single motivational force for all humanity: the tendency toward self-actualization"
(p. 257). He taught that every person
has an innate tendency toward the positive development of actualization of his
or her unique potential to the greatest extent possible. Persons also had another innate capacity called
an, "organismic valuing process" which provided humans with the
ability to choose between what will enhance personal fulfillment and what will
not.
Rogers' theory of mental
health and abnormality, as summarized by Jones and Butman (1991), includes several
key concepts and terms. He believed
that if the parents of a growing child provided it with an atmosphere of
unconditional positive regard and acceptance, the child would be blessed with a
complete awareness of its actualizing tendency and valuing capacity. This awareness, or self-experience,
of the child's natural inclinations would constitute a reliable guide for its
ongoing process of actualization. As
the child's conscious awareness developed, his or her self-concept (i.e.
perception of who he or she actually is) would develop in a manner that was
congruent expectations and evaluations of others. In addition, the child's ideal self, which was his or her
understanding of what he or she should be, would also be congruent with
self-experience since he or she would not aspire to be something other than
what he or she was. Thus, a fully
functioning and mentally healthy individual would be one whose
self-experiences, self-concept and ideal self are congruent. Such an individual would exist comfortably
with his or her changing feelings and experiences and would be successfully
guided by them. Incongruities that
might occur would be minimal and able to be quickly overcome.
Unfortunately, children
rarely develop in such an open and accepting environment. The expectations and demands of parents and
others make it impossible for them to achieve acceptance by relying on their
instincts. These external influences
cause them to deny parts of their self-experience and to develop distortions in
who they perceive themselves to be and who they believe they should
become. As a consequence, their
internal evaluating process becomes impaired, and the choices they make are
adversely affected. In Rogers' theory,
lack of congruence between various aspects of the self is largely responsible
for failures in living and for mental suffering or discomfort (Jones &
Butman, 1991).
This theory of personality
provides the basis for Rogers' conception of therapy. The therapist's task is to create an atmosphere of complete acceptance
and unconditional positive regard so that the self-actualizing potential and
organismic valuing process can safely emerge and the various dimensions of the
self can become integrated. This
happens when the person in therapy is able to replace adopted or imposed values
with those learned from organic experiences.
One way in which Rogers explained this process is seen in the following
quotation:
If a [person in therapy] gives up the guidance of an introjected system of values, what is to take its place? . . . Gradually [the person in therapy] comes to experience the fact that he is making value judgments, in a way that is new to him, and yet a way that was also known to him in his infancy. Just as the infant places an assured value upon an experience, relying on the evidence of his own senses . . . so the client finds that it is his own organism, which supplies the evidence, upon which value judgments may be made. He discovers that his own senses, his own physiological equipment, can provide the data for making value judgments and for continuously revising them (1951, pp. 522-523).
An illustration of the
extent of Rogers' confidence in the innate tendency of human beings to make
good choices can be seen in a speech he delivered to students at a Midwest
college in 1957.
The basic nature of the human being, when functioning freely is constructive and trustworthy. For me this is an inescapable conclusion from a quarter-century of psychotherapy . . . We do not need to ask who will socialize him, for one of his own deepest needs is for affiliation and communication with others. As he becomes more fully himself, he will become realistically socialized. We do not need to ask who will control his aggressive impulses; for as he becomes more open to all of his impulses, his needs to be liked by others and his tendency to give affection will be as strong as his impulses to strike out or to seize for himself. He will be aggressive in situations in which aggression is realistically appropriate, but there will be no runaway need for aggression . . The only control of impulses which would exist, or which would prove necessary, is the natural and internal balancing of one need against another, and the discovery of behaviors which follow the vector most closely approximating the satisfaction of all his needs (Rogers 1961, 194-195).
Critics of humanism have sometimes equated its emphasis on self-actualization with selfishness but this is not completely accurate (Jones & Butman, 1991). Humanists believe that the disposition to relate positively to others is an innate part of a person's natural tendency to actualize. One of Rogers' most far-reaching assertions was that interpersonal and social problems are caused by the failure of individuals to fully actualize and accept themselves. Rogers (1951) described this part of his theory in this way:
The implications of this aspect of our theory are such as to stretch the imagination. Here is a theoretical basis for sound interpersonal, intergroup, and international relationships. Stated in terms of social psychology, this proposition becomes the statement that the person (or persons or group) who accepts himself thoroughly, will necessarily improve his relationships with those with whom he has personal contact, because of his greater understanding and acceptance of them . . . Thus we have, in effect, a psychological "chain reaction" which problems of social relationships (pp. 520-522).
This quotation illustrates
the extent to which Rogers was willing to apply his philosophical assumptions
about human nature and mental health to social problems. Few theorists have been as explicit as he
was in stating their conclusions and extending them to their logical end (Jones
& Butman, 1991).
There are many elements in Rogers' theory that Christians should be able to affirm and benefit from. Some of these positive points include his insistence on understanding persons in a wholistic rather than an atomized, reductionistic manner; his stress on the capacity of individuals to change and grow; his emphasis on the importance of developing an awareness and understanding of ones' feelings and internal conflicts; and his belief that every person has the potential to develop in a unique and individualized manner; (Jones & Butman, 1987). Furthermore, his singular contribution toward an understanding of the dynamics and power of empathic listening, and his emphasis on the growth that is produced when people are treated with honesty, openness and unconditional positive regard deserve much commendation. However, there are fundamental points at which Rogers' theory of personality and behavior have been legitimately questioned and criticized.
Several writers have written
in depth critiques of his theories from a philosophical, scientific, and/or
theological perspective (e.g. Browning, 1987; Geller, 1982; Hart, 1992; Jones
& Butman, 1991; May, 1982, cited in Greening, 1984; Vitz, 1977). I will discuss a number of the criticisms
which are especially important and add comments from other authors. I will begin by emphasizing, as Vitz (1977)
did, the quasi-religious nature of humanistic theory and the type of evidence
upon which it is based. I will then
consider some of the ontological, epistemological, and ethical issues raised by
Rogers' view of persons and conclude by identifying some of the potential
psychological and social consequences of his theory.
Vitz (1977) is one of a
number of theorists who call attention to the overtly "religious"
elements in humanistic psychology. If
one defines religion as a developed system for ascribing ultimate meaning and
purpose to life and which is dependent upon something beyond the methods of
empirical observation for its verification, then Vitz is certainly right. Browning (1987) observes that humanism has
at least two important elements that it holds in common with religious
faith. These are "metaphors of
ultimacy" and a model for ordering the inner life. Regardless of whether it is defensible to
speak of humanism as a religion, its basic claims about human nature and values
have not been empirically verified and are not amenable to such
verification. This is a point about
which Rogers expressed explicit agreement near the end of his career, when
referring to his legendary and vigorous arguments against B. F. Skinner's
behaviorism. At that time he said,
"I have come to realize that the basic difference between a behavioristic
and a humanistic approach to human beings is a philosophical
choice. This certainly can be
discussed, but cannot possibly be settled by evidence" (Rogers, 1974).
Although many of Rogers'
philosophical descendants have been less ready to admit, or less aware of, the
subjective basis for their conclusions than he was, there are signs of a
growing willingness among therapists and theoreticians, (e.g. Rutan, 1992) to
acknowledge that all theories of mental health are value based and are, as
such, beyond the scope of empirical verification.
This point is important for
beginning a discussion of the merits of any theory of personality or change,
(although it does not imply that empirical evidence may not be used to argue
for one theory over another). Once it
is accepted, a discussion of the merits of a theory such as humanism, including
its religious merits, can proceed on a more sound basis.
Rogers and Nouwen both see
humans as suffering from internal and external conflicts. Nouwen, however, does not attribute all
internal suffering to the false demands and expectations of others. He states that our lives are broken, bound
by sin, and in need of "radical transformation," by the "work of
the Holy Spirit" (pp. 50-53). This
conclusion that there are defects in human nature at the most basic and
individual level, while variously interpreted as to cause and extent, is one of
the most basic beliefs of Christianity and most major religions, (Solzhenitsyn,
1975, cited in Vitz, 1977). Many
Christian interpreters conclude that human nature is made up of a mixture of
both good and bad tendencies, rather than as being wholly one or the
other. This means that some experience
of inner conflict is part of what it means to be human.
Rogers (1951), on the other
hand, asserts that "the [human] organism has one basic tendency and
striving--to actualize, maintain, and enhance the experiencing organism; [and
that] rather than many needs and motives, it seems entirely possible that all
organic and psychological needs may be described as partial aspects of this one
fundamental need" (pp. 487-488).
He further maintains that the movement of this single tendency is,
"in the direction of an increasing self-government, self-regulation, and autonomy,
and away from heteronymous control, or control by external forces …[and that
this tendency] appears to be in the direction of socialization, broadly
defined" (p.488). This position
rejects that there is any part of human nature that is basically defective or
out of balance. Eric Fromm (1947, cited
by Vitz, 1977) emphasized this when he said that,
The position taken by humanistic ethics that man is able to know what is good and to act accordingly on the strength of his natural potentialities and of his reason, would be untenable if the dogma of man's innate natural evilness were true (p. 19).
This argument for a single
motive force that is both individually and socially constructive raises a
number of problems. Vitz (1977) points
out that it runs counter, in various ways, to the conclusions of many
psychologists (particularly those in the psychodynamic tradition such as Freud
& Klien); ethnologists (including Nobel laureates Konrad Lorenz and Niko
Tinbergen) and biologists (such as Ludwig von Bertalanffy) who have seen
dynamics such as conflict, and/or tendencies toward destructive aggression, as
an innate part of the human of the human character.
On what evidence have
humanists based their conclusions for a single, harmonious motivating
force? Browning (1987) points out that
humanistic psychologists do not derive the idea of the self-actualization
tendency as a moral norm from observationally based explanations of human
motivation. Rather they "identify
a variety of goods which they recognize to be morally justifiable on grounds
independent of the facts of human motivation (our various tendencies and needs)
and then attribute them to our biologically grounded actualization
tendency" (p. 74).
A second problem with the
single-motive theory of human behavior is that it logically requires the
complete externalization of responsibility for inner conflicts. Jones and Butman (1991) illustrate this
difficulty in the following words:
Suggesting one drive, and a totally good one at that, leads to attributing all human distress to forces external to the person. If we ever experience conflict, it cannot be due to a true struggle within ourselves, but rather to a pseudostuggle between our true selves (all good) and some sort of false selves, which are presumed to have originated externally from how significant others have treated us (pp. 265-266).
Since Rogers championed
virtues of individual freedom and autonomy, it is paradoxical that this aspect
of his theory would seem to encourage people to assume the psychological stance
of being victims. There is a third
problem with the single motivational theory of human nature that should be
noted. When Rogers extends his theory
of actualization into the arena of interpersonal relationships and suggests
that it contains the key to social harmony, he creates a logical hurdle of
enormous proportions. Browning (1987),
in a detailed discussion of this assertion, notes that it requires one to
maintain that there is a "pre-established harmony of all
potentialities." (p. 760). When
applied just to the microcosm of a single family unit, it necessitates the
belief that, "the self-actualization of the potentials of any one member
of the family could occur without interfering with or impeding the
self-actualization of any other member of the family" (p. 82). When applied to the international level, as
Rogers does, the belief that all potentialities harmonize requires a giant leap
of faith. Yet this is the leap humanism
take. Browning (1987) refers to
statements by Maslow (1965) which specifically point in this direction and then
summarizes the underlying position as follows:
The actualization of our various potentials can be morally justified as our primary obligation simply because the world, at its depth, is basically harmonious, and all undistorted and basic needs, potentials, and self-actualizations complement each other and lead to mutuality and reciprocity (p. 82).
The question that this
theory fails to adequately explain is why social disharmony continues unabated
if the natural tendencies of each individual in society and the real and true
balance of moral forces in the world are harmonious and good. The Christian belief that sin has caused a
disruption of harmony within each individual as well as within the entire
universe (Rom. 8:22), provides a more simple and parsimonious explanation for
human evil than does the humanistic view.
The Christian view suggests that, "our good impulses and our bad
impulses, our love for and rebellion against God, are both representative of our
true selves" (Jones & Butman p. 266).
It also maintains that self-enhancement and social harmony come about
through a spiritual regeneration of our true selves. This is one of the most basic ontological distinction between the
two theories of human nature.
Rogers' theory not only merits criticism for its position on the nature of human nature, it also raises epistemological and ethical difficulties. With respect to the sources of knowledge, Rogers' emphasize on the ultimate reliability of self-experience (when it is in congruence with the organismic valuing process) differs significantly from Christian thought. The Christian traditional holds that all of human nature has been affected by sin and therefore no part of it is perfectly trustworthy.
Many Christians would affirm
Kant's belief that humans have an awareness of "the moral law
within," and in this sense agree that humans have, (at least under normal
circumstances) an intrinsic sense of right and wrong (Lewis, 1943; Malony,
1986). For this, as well as other
reasons, a Biblically Christian theology would reject any suggestion that the
Gospel calls upon persons to live in a way that is out of harmony with their
true selves. It should also be noted
that Protestant theology has given particular emphasis to the importance of
living in harmony with ones' conscience or moral intuition. But Christian thinking has stopped short of
suggesting that the subjective experience of the individual is the final
arbiter of moral and religious truth.
It has emphasized the importance of other sources of truth, the most
fundamental of which are the principles and teachings contained in Scripture as
well as other sources of divine revelation, such as the role of the discerning
community. Jones and Butman (1991)
contrast this approach to truth with that of Rogers who they describe as,
"optimistic about ones' experience as the basis of determining truth, but
rather pessimistic about the value of culture, dogma, traditions, and systems
of morality" (p. 263).
It is hardly necessary to note that the Christian view of personal wholeness includes an acceptance of ethical imperatives. Nouwen, for example, speaks of obedience to God as an ethical ideal and his emphasis on discipline and character transformation have ethical dimensions as well. Rogers, on the other hand, clearly stated that his theory constituted a reaction against, and an alternative to, religious ethical imperatives.
But one of the most
distinguishing features of his theory of personality is its implicit ethical
system. Browning (1987) notes a shift
in the writings of Rogers and other humanistic psychologists from simply
maintaining that, "the tendency toward self-actualization is the
basic nature of humans to the assertion that it is good and that,
therefore, all humans should pursue the life of self-actualization"
(p. 70). Thus, actualization of ones'
self becomes a moral obligation. But
humanism's understanding of individual and social pathology creates an even
more far-reaching moral imperative.
This is the imperative to avoid imposing values on others. The logic of this moral stance is
clear. Since the self is good and
obligations and expectations placed on us by others are the cause of individual
and social pathology, then teaching others how to live is not only unnecessary,
but individually dehumanizing and socially destructive. Freedom and unconditional positive regard
(which except for during the "therapeutic hour" are often downgraded
to the virtue of tolerance), both of which are important and necessary values,
become the highest values because they are ultimately the only values that are
believed to be necessary.
Christian ethics holds that
the principle of agape love is the highest virtue and that its clearest
expression is seen in the person of Jesus.
This love is not possible unless accompanied by the virtue of freedom,
but it is more than freedom. It is
unconditional, but is not the same thing as unconditional positive regard in
the Rogerian sense. It strengthens and
integrates the self, but it is also self-sacrificing (Roberts, 1985).
Agape love's
self-sacrificing quality cannot be easily or naturally integrated into the
Rogerian idea of personal fulfillment.
But agape love sacrifices when genuine good (as, opposed to such false
goods as the enabling of addictions or the perpetuation of abuse) will be
brought about by doing so. When the
self is respected and appreciated (as it should be), and when it is given to
others from a positive of freedom and spiritual strength, the giver transmits
something of great value, and according to Christian thinking, is blessed with
a depth of meaning and joy that can only be understood in spiritual or
religious terms. This is what Jesus
referred to when he said that the one, "who loses his life for my sake
will find it" (Matt. 10:39; Mk. 8:35)
Rogers' theory of human nature and therapy developed as reaction against what he saw to be the dogmatism of conservative and legalistic religion and the rationalistic qualities of psychoanalysis (Jones & Butman, 1991). It quickly developed, as this paper has attempted to show, its own set of faith assumptions and ethical imperatives and has taken on the quality characteristic of religious belief for many people.
It needs to be emphasized
that humanistic psychology would not have experienced and rapid acceptance if
many of its ideas had not already been embedded in American political and
economic philosophy (Bloom, 1987; Browning, 1987; Rogers 1951; Vitz,
1977). Rogers' and Maslow's theories
were popularized during the years immediately following World War II when the
American economy was enjoying unprecedented growth. The economic system that produced this prosperity championed
individualism, creativity and the belief that the primary role of government
was limited to that of protecting the freedom of its citizens to pursue their
own self-interest. Humanism inferred
that these political and economic principles could be applied with equal success
to the arenas of individual and social morality. This linking of political and individual values was what Hauerwas
(1981) referred to when he observed that, "our private morality has
increasingly followed the form of our public life. People feel their only public duty is to follow their own
interests as far as possible, limited only by the rule that we do not unfairly
limit others' freedom" (p. 79).
I draw attention to this
connection between American cultural values and the popularity of humanism's
theory of the self for two reasons. One
is to note that Rogers and his fellow humanists did not originate a completely
new way of thinking as much as they helped popularize and extend one which was
already present within the culture. The
other is to note that problems, which have become increasingly apparent in
America's political system illustrate the inadequacy of the pursuit of private
needs as an ethical ideal. Citizens and
the media frequently express outrage when political leaders put personal interests
or the benefits of local constituents above the good of the larger society,
while at the same time professing allegiance to a belief system which says that
pursuing one's self-interest is an individual's primary moral obligation and
that it is destructive to question or criticize the ethical choices of
others. They may have the disquieting
sense that they lack an integrated moral vision but be unaware of the extent to
which this sense arises from competing and contradictory beliefs about what
makes life good.
The humanistic understanding
of personhood and wholeness fosters a public morality that Hauerwas (1981) has
aptly referred to as "vulgar relativism," namely, a relativized view
of most ethical principles combined with a non-relativized view of the
principle of toleration (p. 104). The
psychological and spiritual result is a diminishment of a vital part of what it
means to be human, for, as Hauerwas says, "In the interests of securing
tolerance, we are forced to pay the price of having our differences rendered
morally irrelevant" (p. 104).
Bloom (1987) has argued that many college students believe that there is
a necessary connection between the principles of toleration and relativism
because they have been taught that a belief in the latter is necessary to avoid
prejudice. But relativism ultimately
undermines all principles, including the principle of toleration. Thus it provides culture with an
insufficient means for its own sustenance (Bloom, 1987; Hauerwas, 1981).
The Rogerian conception that
our only innate tendency is to self-actualize in a way that is good for
ourselves and others, may seem to remove the annoying concepts of guilt and sin
from the psyche, but it does so, as already mentioned, at the cost of either
denying evil altogether or attributing responsibility for it entirely to
others. This latter tendency can lead
to an undiscriminating use of psychological tasks, which emphasize emotional
independence from significant, others as a prerequisite to mental health. It can thus affect the way we seek a balance
between individuation and intimacy. A
strong emphasis on individuating tasks is clearly indicated in cases where
self-esteem has been damaged by over-control and abuse, but in Rogerian logic
any control that does more than guarantee a growing child's physical safety and
development is over-control.
A final difficulty with
Rogerian view of human nature is the unrealistic expectations it creates. It promises that satisfying interpersonal
relationships (as well as freedom from inner conflicts) will come naturally if
people learn to accept themselves fully.
It de-emphasizes or rejects the importance of developing character
through overcoming innate tendencies toward selfishness, and creates the false
expectation that families and communities can be held together without
sacrifice.
Many people are attracted to the conviction that humans are by nature innately and completely good because they equate being good with being of worth and value, and/or because they have been taught to believe that if people are not basically good they must be basically evil (which is interpreted as "entirely" evil). Jesus, however, never connected the basis of human worth with the issue of human nature, nor did he say that all our tendencies were completely evil. He taught that people were of value because God created them and loved them. As a historical figure, he is perhaps most widely admired for how he combated prejudice and accepted people whom others rejected. He is also known for opposing attempts to legislate personal morality, but he was hardly a moral relativist or a person who avoided arguing and preaching about values and obligations. He taught that in this life we would always experience difficulties but that it was God's will for us to enjoy a satisfying existence and meaningful relationships.
Nouwen has summarized some key elements of the way of life that Jesus described and some steps for beginning to live it. The purpose of Jesus' way is to change our focus and our source of motivation from many things to the one, most important thing. Rogers also emphasizes the value of moving away from a life guided by many things to the one, most important thing. For Rogers, this most important thing is the self. For Nouwen it is the kingdom of God. Both invite us to give up an existence nourished by scraps gathered from diverse sources of meaning, but they call us to different tables. The contrast between these two perspectives arises from their different beliefs about ultimate reality and human nature.
I have not attempted to
develop the implications of these two views for a philosophy of education. The ways in which Rogers applied his
theories to teaching are well known (for example, see Robinson, 1985; Rogers,
1974), and much has been written about the relationship between a Christian
worldview and education (e.g. De Jong, 1990; Holmes, 1975; White, 1903). I do believe that the issues identified in
this paper are important for Christian educators (particularly those who teach
psychology, sociology, and theology) to identify and discuss with
students. Educators would do well to
help their students understand the challenge that humanistic psychology
presents to Christian thought and encourage them to evaluate its philosophical
basis critically and fairly.
I will suggest a few of the
practical questions that could be used to facilitate this process. Students could be encouraged to compare
Freud's beliefs that human is basically conflicted and that it consists of both
destructive and constructive drives, with Rogers' belief that humans have one
basic drive (the drive toward self-actualization) of which all others are a
part. They could be asked which view,
if either, is most consistent with the Christian view of persons? Are there problems with each? Related questions would be: Do humans have a single core self (or true self)
that can be discovered through introspection or therapy and used as a guide for
life? Is it possible to accept Rogers'
view of human nature and still explain the continuation of sin in the
world? What is the meaning of Ellen
White's (1909) statement that the image of God was not completely destroyed in
persons by sin?
Other questions to consider would be: Is it necessary to love oneself in order to love one's neighbor? Does love and acceptance of oneself automatically lead to love and acceptance of others? What similarities and differences are there between the Rogerian concept of unconditional positive regard and the Christian ideal of agape love.
These are just some of the
questions that could be used to help students think more critically about
Christianity and the cultural currents that have been influenced by humanistic
psychology. Each of these questions, in
one way or another, relates to the central issue of human nature, and how human
feelings and behavior can be modified, changed or redirected.
The importance of these
issues cannot be overemphasized. As
Tjelveit (1989, cited by Jones & Butman, 1991) has stated,
Models of human beings--explicit or implicit, complex or simple, internally consistent or inconsistent, . . . open to change or static--shape society, the actions of every human being, and every individual's worldview.
Teachers and students need to
critically examine their concepts of human nature and understand the
implications of these concepts for how they live their lives.
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